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The Federal Reserve
Bernanke's bounty
Sep 20th 2007 | WASHINGTON, DC
From The Economist print edition
Was the Federal Reserve's large cut in interest rates a sign of panic or prudence?
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WALL STREET had been hoping for it. By some measures, financial markets had been half-expecting it. But when America's central bankers on September 18th cut the short-term federal-funds rate by half a percentage point, to 4.75%, investors reacted as gleefully as children who spy a chocolate birthday cake.
The Dow Jones Industrial Average ended the day up 336 pointsa 2.51% gain, and the biggest one-day jump since April 2003. The broader S&P index rose 2.9%. Wall Street's giddier commentators could hardly contain themselves I would hug these guys gushed Jim Cramer, a CNBC pundit whose screaming pleas for lower interest rates epitomised August's panic.
The Fed's move came a day after Britain's government announced it would guarantee all deposits at the stricken mortgage lender, Northern Rock, and the day that Lehman Brothers reported third-quarter results that were not as bad as many had feared (see article).
A day later the Bank of England abandoned its hard-nosed attitude to greasing the money markets (see article). America's housing regulators also did an about-turn, announcing that they would allow the government-sponsored mortgage giants, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, to expand their portfolios to help alleviate the mortgage squeeze.
This barrage of good news worked a treat. Stock markets across the globe followed Wall Street upwards. Nerves calmed in the money markets and the most moribund corners of the credit landscape showed signs of life. Banks became more willing to lend to each other. Blue-chip borrowers raised billions of dollars of new debt. Even the junk-bond market began to function. R.H. Donnelley, the firm that publishes Yellow Pages, raised far more than the $650m it had planned in the first junk-bond issue of any size since late July.
To many on Wall Street, all this marked a turning point for which Mr Bernanke, in particular, deserves credit. Not only had the Fed recognised the risks that financial turbulence posed to America's economy, it had acted boldly to head them off. And that, concluded euphoric investors, would probably mean even lower interest rates ahead. Judging by the price of Fed funds' futures, financial markets reckon there is an 80% probability of another quarter-point cut on October 31st.
Not everyone was happy, however. Hawks worried that the Fed had bailed out Wall Street and compromised its inflation-fighting credentials. Far from eschewing the Greenspan put (Wall Street shorthand for the willingness of Alan Greenspan to cut interest rates in the face of financial turmoil), his successor, Mr Bernanke, had created a put of his own. Allan Meltzer, author of a history of the Federal Reserve, called the decision a big error. The central bankers, he argued, had listened to the Siren song of the markets. History suggested they would regret it.
Several measures of inflationary jitters wobbled: the price of gold futures hit a 27-year high of $735.50 an ounce and yields on 30-year Treasury bonds rose. The dollar continued to slide, hitting a new low against the euro of close to 1.40. Mr Greenspan himself gave ammunition to the inflation worriers. His memoirs (see article) argued that the disinflationary pressures of the past were ebbing and central bankers' jobs were becoming harder.
Look carefully, however, and both Wall Street's euphoria and the hawks' nervousness are overdone. Inflation is always a risk, but the Fed is hardly in danger of allowing price pressures to get out of control. Figures released on September 19th showed that core consumer prices, excluding food and fuel, rose by 2.1% in the year to August, down from 2.2% in the year to July.
What is more, although the central bankers' actions were boldin addition to cutting the federal funds rate, they also cut the discount rate by half a percentage point to 5.25%monetary policy is hardly easy. One rule of thumb is to compare nominal interest rates to nominal GDP. At 4.75%, the Fed funds rate is now roughly in line with nominal GDP growth over the past few quarters, suggesting that interest rates are broadly neutral.
Perhaps most importantly, the central bankers left themselves plenty of room for manoeuvre. The statement accompanying the Fed's decision made clear that the rate cut was intended to help forestall the adverse effects on the economy from financial-market disruptions. But it made no commitment that more cuts would be coming. The central bankers said they would act as needed to foster price stability and sustainable economic growth. And this statement (unlike the previous one on August 17th) included an explicit reference to inflation risks.
Much depends on what drove the Fed's decision. Tactics may have played a role, particularly a desire to avoid a repeat of September 1998. After Russia's default and the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management, a hedge fund, the Fed cut rates by a quarter point. Disappointed, markets plunged and the central bankers were rattled into cutting rates again long before their next scheduled meeting. By acting boldly now, Mr Bernanke must hope to avoid hasty inter-meeting cuts.
Risk management undoubtedly played a part too. Even if the most likely outcome for the economy has not worsened dramatically, the risks of a truly nasty downturn have risen. A bold cut now was probably designed, in part, to reduce those risks.
New research from within the central bank doubtless bolstered the case too. Frederic Mishkin, a governor, argued forcefully in a recent speech that central bankers can cushion the impact of falling house prices on the economy, provided they act quickly and decisively, at little cost in terms of inflation. His simulations suggested that if central bankers behaved optimally, a 20% drop in house prices over two years would drag the economy's growth down no more than half a percentage point while consumer prices would rise less than 0.1 of a percentage point faster than they otherwise would.
Financial markets seem to share Mr Mishkin's confidence. This week's euphoria assumed policymakers would manage to stave off economic trouble. Investors all but ignored more bad news from the housing marketbuilders' pessimism at levels not seen since the 1991 recession and a further plunge in housing starts. But if, as seems likely, the economy shows more signs of weakness in coming weeks, confidence will wane. Then Mr Bernanke's party spirit will once again be tested.
Copyright © 2007 The Economist Newspaper and The Economist Group. All rights reserved.
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